We study probabilistic logic under the viewpoint of the coherence principle of de Finetti. In detail, we explore the relationship between coherencebased and model-theoretic probabilistic logic. Interestingly, we show that the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment can be expressed by combining notions in model-theoretic probabilistic logic with concepts from default reasoning. Crucially, we even show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is a probabilistic generalization of default reasoning in system P. That is, we provide a new probabilistic semantics for system P, which is neither based on infinitesimal probabilities nor on atomic-bound (or also big-stepped) probabilities. These results also give new insight into default reasoning with conditional objects.
Introduction
The probabilistic treatment of uncertainty plays an important role in many applications of knowledge representation and reasoning. Often, we need to reason with uncertain information under partial knowledge and then the use of precise probabilistic assessments seems unrealistic. Moreover, the family of uncertain quantities at hand has often no particular algebraic structure.
In such cases, a general approach is obtained by using (conditional and/or unconditional) probabilistic constraints, based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and suitable generalizations of it [5, 9, 15, 16] . Two important aspects in dealing with uncertainty are: (i) checking the consistency of a probabilistic assessment; and (ii) the propagation of a given assessment to further uncertain quantities.
Another approach for handling probabilistic constraints is model-theoretic probabilistic logic, whose roots go back to Boole's book of 1854 "The Laws of Thought" [8] . There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored in probabilistic logic, which ranges from constraints for unconditional and conditional events [2, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23] to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events [12] . The main problems related to model-theoretic probabilistic logic are checking satisfiability, deciding logical entailment, and computing tight logically entailed intervals.
Coherence-based and model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning have been explored quite independently from each other by two different research communities. For this reason, the relationship between the two areas has not been studied in depth so far. The current paper and our work in [7] aim at filling this gap. More precisely, our research is essentially guided by the following two questions:
Which is the semantic relationship between coherence-based and model-theoretic probabilistic reasoning? Can algorithms that have been developed for efficient reasoning in one area also be used in the other area?
Interestingly, it turns out that the answers to these two questions are closely related to default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases in system P.
The literature contains several different proposals for default reasoning and extensive work on its desired properties. The core of these properties are the rationality postulates of system P proposed by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [18] . It turned out that these rationality postulates constitute a sound and complete axiom system for several classical model-theoretic entailment relations under uncertainty measures on worlds. More precisely, they characterize classical model-theoretic entailment under preferential structures [25, 18] , infinitesimal probabilities [1, 24] , possibility measures [10] , and world rankings. They also characterize an entailment relation based on conditional objects [11] . A survey of all these relationships is given in [3] .
Roughly speaking, coherence-based probabilistic reasoning is reducible to modeltheoretic probabilistic reasoning using concepts from default reasoning. Crucially, it even turns out that coherence-based probabilistic reasoning is a probabilistic generalization of default reasoning in system P. That is, we provide a new probabilistic semantics for system P, which is neither based on infinitesimal probabilities nor on atomic-bound (or also big-stepped) probabilities [4, 26] .
The current paper deals with the semantic aspects of these findings, while [7] focuses on its algorithmic implications for coherence-based probabilistic reasoning.
The main contributions of the current paper can be summarized as follows:
We define a coherence-based probabilistic logic. We define a formal language of logical and conditional constraints, which are defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We then define the notions of generalized coherence (or g-coherence), g-coherent consequence, and tight g-coherent consequence for this language. We explore the relationship between g-coherence and g-coherent entailment, on the one hand, and satisfiability and logical entailment, on the other hand. We show that probabilistic reasoning under coherence is a probabilistic generalization of default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases in system P. We show that this relationship reveals new insight into Dubois and Prade's approach to default reasoning with conditional objects [11, 3] .
Note that detailed proofs of all results are given in the extended paper [6] . 
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Probability Assessments
A conditional event is an expression 
In the previous formula, we identify the truth values
with the real numbers f and g , respectively. Intuitively, q can be interpreted as the random gain corresponding to a combination of n bets of amounts , respectively, turns out to be true. The following notion of coherence now assures that it is impossible (for both the gambler and the bookmaker) to have uniform loss.
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Probabilistic Logic under Coherence
In the rest of this paper, we assume that 
For gcoherent 7
and conditional constraints
The logical knowledge "all penguins are birds" and the probabilistic knowledge "birds have legs with a probability of at least 0.95", "birds fly with a probability between 0.9 and 0.95", and "penguins fly with a probability of at most 0.05" can be expressed by the following probabilistic knowledge base
are tight g-coherent consequences of 7 .
Relationship to Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
In this section, we characterize the notions of g-coherence and of g-coherent entailment in terms of the notions of satisfiability and of logical entailment.
Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
A probabilistic interpretation3¹ is a probability function on g h 
The truth of logical and conditional constraints
. We say3¹ satisfies a logical or conditional constraint 
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G-Coherence in Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
The following theorem shows how g-coherence can be expressed through the existence of probabilistic interpretations. This result follows from a characterization of gcoherence in [15] . It shows that 7 q ) 0 u 2 
It then follows that g-coherence has a characterization similar to AE -consistency in default reasoning. To formulate this result, we adopt the following terminology from default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases [3] . A probabilistic interpretation3¹ verifies a conditional constraint We are now ready to characterize g-coherence in a way similar to AE -consistency by Goldszmidt and Pearl [17] . Note that in [7] we use this characterization to provide a new algorithm for deciding g-coherence, which is essentially a reformulation of a previous algorithm by Gilio [15] using terminology from default reasoning, and which is closely related to an algorithm for checking AE -consistency given in [17] . 1
G-Coherent Entailment in Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
We 
In summary, by Theorems 3.5 and 3.6, a tight interval under g-coherent entailment can be computed by first checking g-coherence, and then computing a tight interval under logical entailment [7] . Semantically, Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 show that gcoherent entailment coincides with logical entailment from a smaller knowledge base. That is, under g-coherent entailment, we simply cut away a part of the knowledge base. Roughly speaking, we remove all those conditional constraints
. Intuitively, g-coherent entailment does not have the property of inheritance, neither for logical knowledge nor for probabilistic knowledge, while logical entailment shows inheritance of logical knowledge but not of probabilistic knowledge. The following example illustrates this difference. Example 3.7. Consider the following probabilistic knowledge base:
Notice that 7 is g-coherent and satisfiable. Moreover, we have:
That is, under g-coherent entailment, neither the logical property of having legs nor the probabilistic one of having wings is inherited from birds to penguins. Under logical entailment, however, the logical property is inherited, while the probabilistic one is not.
Coherence-Based versus Model-Theoretic Probabilistic Logic
We now describe the rough relationship between g-coherence and satisfiability, and between g-coherent entailment and logical entailment. The following theorem shows that g-coherence implies satisfiability. This result is immediate by Theorem 3.1. In fact, g-coherence is strictly stronger than satisfiability, as the next example shows. 
. It is easy to verify that 7 is satisfiable, but not g-coherent.
The next theorem shows that logical entailment is stronger than g-coherent entailment. That is, g-coherent consequence implies logical consequence (or there are more conditional constraints logically entailed than entailed under g-coherence) and the tight intervals that are derived under logical entailment are subintervals of those derived under g-coherent entailment. This result follows immediately from Theorem 3.5. 
The following example now shows that logical entailment is in fact strictly stronger than g-coherent entailment (note that we identify e g r f h
with the empty set).
Example 3.11. Consider the following probabilistic knowledge bases 7 
G-Coherence and P-Consistency
We now show that g-coherence is a generalization of AE -consistency. Recall first that the characterization of AE -consistency by Goldszmidt and Pearl [17] corresponds to the characterization of g-coherence given in Theorem 3.2.
The following well-known result (see especially [14] ) shows that AE -consistency is equivalent to the existence of admissible default rankings. .
The following theorem finally shows the important result that g-coherence is a generalization of AE -consistency. 
G-Coherent Entailment and P-Entailment
We now show that g-coherent entailment is a generalization of AE -entailment. The following result is essentially due to Adams [ 
The following theorem shows that a similar result holds for g-coherent consequence, which is an immediate implication of the definition of g-coherent entailment. 
